

Pages 1 through 3 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(3) (10 U.S.C. § 130b), (b)(6)

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(U) PREFACE

~~(S)~~ The purpose of this case study is to highlight the significant actions that Task Force (b)(1)1.7(e) undertook in support of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) efforts to find, fix and recover Sergeant (SGT) Bowe Bergdahl (b)(1)1.7(e). In highlighting these actions, the study also captures observations and insights from many of those involved.

(b)(1)1.7(e) During the nearly five year length of (b)(1)1.7(e) activity in Pakistan, (b)(1)1.7(e) level of dedicated involvement was sporadic for the first three years due to the lack of actionable intelligence and competing mission requirements (b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

~~(S)~~ This study addresses a few of the driving functions from 2009—2012 and then the establishment and primary actions (b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a) he reintegration efforts upon (b)(1)1.7(e) recovery are highlighted and provide most of the lessons learned and observations as this aspect of the operation was the most unique due to his extensive time in captivity.

~~(S)~~ The scope of this study includes neither (b)(1)1.7(e) departure from his post of duty nor the Taliban (TB) prisoner exchange as those events were beyond the control of this Command.

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(S) On 30 June 2009, the leadership of B Company, 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (B-1-501 PIR) discovered that one of their soldiers, Private First Class (PFC) Bowe Bergdahl, was missing from Observation Post (OP) Mest in Paktika Province, Afghanistan. PFC Bergdahl's unit immediately declared the initial duty status - whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN) notification.

(S) All initial Coalition Forces efforts failed

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)

July 2009. From this date through 2011, USCENTCOM served as the lead (b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a) the effort to find and recover (b)(1)1.7(e)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)



(U) Figure 2: PFC Bowe Bergdahl, Pre-deployment

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

successfully negotiated

(b)(1)1.7(e)

release.

(b)(1)1.4(a)

recovered

(b)(1)1.7(e)

in Afghanistan on

31 May 2014.

(b)(1)1.4(a)

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(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.7(e)

(U) CHRONOLOGY

~~(S)~~ The following chronology reflects

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(U) Figure 5: Chronology

(U) NARRATIVE - DUSTWUN THROUGH RECOVERY (2009-2014)

(U) DUSTWUN through the Surge (2009-2012)

~~(S)~~ On the morning of 30 June 2009, the leadership of B-1-501 PIR reported that

(b)(1)1.7(e)

(b)(1)1.7(e) was missing from observation post (OP) Mest in Paktika Province, Afghanistan. Immediately upon the DUSTWUN report, Coalition assets from the region, to include (b)(1)1.7(e) focused their efforts on finding (b)(1)1.7(e) under the operational nam

(b)(1)1.4(a)


(b)(1)1.4(c)

(b)(1)1.4(c)

During this initial stage, there was a collaborative effort across the battle-space to locate Objective MONTANA. This effort was especially true

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a)




(U) Figure 6: Initial DUSTWUN Timeline and Associated Map

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.4(c)

(b)(1)1.4(a)



(U) Figure 7: Objective MONTANA
Proof-of-Life Video

(U) Assumption of the Lead for Find, Fix and Recovery (17 January 2012)

(b)(1)1.4(a)

(b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(1)1.7(e)

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(b)(1)1.4(a)

(U) OPERATION EGRESS RECAP

U) On 15 APR 1972, the U.S. Air Force published their reintegration plan, Operation EGRESS RECAP, for the expected release of over 600 POWs from North Vietnam. In accordance with the plan, affected installation commanders placed a colonel in charge of all reintegration requirements. Of note, the U.S. Air Force only provided reintegration training for the officers in charge of Operation EGRESS RECAP responsibilities at the various bases. The reintegration focused more on the administrative requirements of ensuring the returnees were back in the system. The reintegration plan addressed intelligence debriefings with the intent of identifying prisoners who were unaccounted for. The quality of the debriefings, especially not related to the status of POWs still considered MIA, was questionable at best due to a lack of properly trained debriefers. The desire to reunite the returnees with families also influenced the speed of the reintegration, unless there was an obvious medical or psychological issue with the latter being more difficult to assess much of the time. The high numbers of returnees coupled with the un-prepared reintegration teams resulted in a failure to maximize the gain of SERE lessons learned and intelligence. In the case of Objective MONTANA, a sole returnee, the reintegration teams maximized the ability to garner SERE lessons while ensuring his well-being.



(U) Figure 12: Vietnam War American PW Reuniting with Family

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(U) ANNEX B - ACRONYMS

AO	Area of Operation	NGA	National Geospatial Agency
AOR	Area of Responsibility	NIPF	National Intelligence Priority Framework
BAF	Bagram Airfield	NSA	National Security Agency
CAPOC	Controlled Access Principal Only Communication	NSS	National Security Staff
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency	PIR	Priority Intelligence Report
CJOA	Combined Joint Area of Responsibility	PR	Personnel Recovery
CONOP	Concept of Operation	RC	Regional Command
CONUS	Continental United States	RTC	Reintegration Team Chief
CSG	Counterterrorism Small Group	SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
CT	Counterterrorism	TB	Taliban
CTC-PAD	Counterterrorism Center - Pakistan/ Afghanistan Division	USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency	USEUCOM	United States European Command
DoS	Department of State	USFOR-A	United States Forces - Afghanistan
DUSTWUN	Duty Status - Whereabouts Unknown	USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
ETF	Expeditionary Task Force		
HUMINT	Human Intelligence		
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas		
FMV	Full Motion Video		
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order		
GOP	Government of Pakistan		
HQN	Haqqani Network		
ISAF	International Stability Assistance Force		
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance		
JHT	Joint Hostage Team		
JOC	Joint Operation Center		
JTT-A	Joint Targeting Force - Afghanistan		
KLE	Key Leader Engagement		
LRMC	Landstuhl Regional Medical Center		
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement		
NAI	Named Area of Interest		

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